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The Persian Gulf War introduced a new, highly effective threat in the form of the
mobile short range ballistic missile (SRBM). The non-guided SCUD missile proved to
be most effective in the political arena as Iraq continually targeted Israel in an attempt
to force them into the conflict through retaliation. Although this Iraqi objective
ultimately failed, a price was paid by the Coalition forces. A significant percentage of
Allied air sorties were diverted to search for fixed and mobile SCUD launch sites. The
mobile launchers proved to be highly elusive as post-war analysis has shown little or no
success in countering them. Post-war research and development continues to focus on
the improvement of post-missile-launch tactics used during Desert Storm to counter the
mobile launchers. This thesis introduces an integrated approach to the problem which
stresses the inclusion of mobile launcher prosecution prior to weapon release. The
general principles of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) are suggested as a structure to build
an effective mobile SRBM counter effort doctrine. The benefit of pre-hostility
intelligence and pre-missile-launch prosecution, the backbone of successful ASW, is
revealed through the analysis of a circulation model which reflects the standard
operations of a third world mobile missile launcher during hostilities. A decision model
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As evidenced by the Persian Gulf War, the short range ballistic missile (SRBM)
is a highly effective political weapon even when its direct military effectiveness is, as in
the case of the non-guided SCUD missile used by Iraq, relatively low. Indirectly, the
public fears and possible political repercussions created by SCUD missile launches forced
the Allies to divert a significant percentage of air sorties, previously scheduled for other
missions, to hunt for both fixed launch sites and mobile launchers [Ref. 1]. It
is proposed that the degree to which the Iraqi government measured the success of their
SRBM force was based largely on the capability of continuous SCUD missile launches
throughout the war, independent of whether the intended target was destroyed or not.
In this respect, the mission was highly successful.
The scramble to destroy the elusive mobile SRBM launchers became headline news
as the war proceeded and a number of SCUD missiles, apparently not launched from
fixed sites, penetrated the air defenses of the Coalition, with a few reaching their targets
inside Israel and Saudi Arabia. The speculation that Iraq might use chemical warheads
on its missiles increased the urgency of the mission. One can assume that other potential
third world adversaries noted the success of Iraq's mobile missile force and might view
them as an effective weapon system in which to invest. The threat appears here to stay
and will only become more accurate and lethal with time.
B. SCOPE OF THESIS
The mobile SRBM counter effort is examined in this thesis. Emphasis is placed
on prosecuting the mobile launchers themselves. The current counter effort focus is
briefly described and possible shortcomings are pointed out. A restructuring of the
mobile launcher counter effort is called for using the general principles of anti-submarine
\
warfare as a basic doctrine upon which to build. The benefits of, and policy
development for, prosecuting the mobile launchers prior to missile launch are stressed.
The following chapters provide a partial answer to questions concerning the mobile
SRBM counter effort. They raise questions concerning the actual hardware, tactics, and
intelligence requirements by modeling the counter effort as a decision analysis problem.
Included in the model is the ability to make trade-offs among methods of countering the
third world mobile SRBM threat.
C. THESIS GOALS AND OUTLINE
This thesis has three specific yet related goals. The first is to restructure the
current SRBM counter effort focus to include pre-missile-launch search tactics and pre-
hostility intelligence effort against the mobile missile launchers. Second, to provide the
decision maker or analyst with a tool to gain valuable insight into the development of
pre-hostility intelligence policies. Third, and ultimately, to avoid repeating the less than
optimal results obtained during the Persian Gulf War in countering the mobile SRBM
threat in future third world conflicts.
Chapter I has introduced the problem and stated the scope and goals of the thesis.
Chapter II argues the case for requiring pre-missile-launch and pre-hostility tactics
against mobile launchers to optimally counter the SRBM threat. In Chapter III, a
decision model is constructed to reflect the events and decisions that must be made, with
respect to mobile missile launchers, leading up to the outbreak of hostilities with a third
world country. Chapter IV analyzes the decision model and presents a methodology to
determine optimal policies to counter the mobile launchers. Chapter V contains
concluding remarks and a recommendation for further work.
H. THE MOBILE SRBM COUNTER EFFORT
A. THE PROBLEM
The mission of defeating or significantly suppressing the mobile SRBM threat is
not an easy one. Post Desert Storm analyses have discounted the optimistic war time
battle damage assessment of a significant percentage of mobile launchers destroyed.
Some reports have indicated a lower bound of zero on the estimated number destroyed
during the conflict [Ref. 2]. The effectiveness of the PATRIOT system in
defeating incoming missiles is also under debate. All reports agree that the inclusive
counter effort failed to produce results which normally indicate mission success.
B. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
To the analyst familiar with the general principles of anti-submarine warfare
(ASW), the poor results of the counter effort to suppress mobile SCUD launcher activity
during the Persian Gulf War come as no surprise. An effective counter effort against a
highly elusive target such as a mobile missile launcher or a submarine, should not begin
after weapon release, as is the current focus, but well before the threat is in the position
to do so. This section introduces the concept of including pre-missile-launch search
tactics as well as pre-hostility intelligence effort in the mobile launcher counter effort and
suggests an existing structure to use to create an effective counter effort doctrine.
1. Current Focus
Current research and development to counter the mobile SRBM threat is
focused primarily on post-missile-launch hardware and tactics to counter both the missiles
and the mobile launchers. Air defense systems such as PATRIOT are being designed to
kill incoming missiles with a high degree of confidence. Weapon systems are being
developed to allow for greater success in the prosecution of launchers after missile launch
cuing data is received, referred to in this thesis as the flaming datum tactic. All these
approaches assume that the mobile SRBM problem begins after missile launch. The
remainder of this thesis focuses on the benefits and policy development of prosecuting
the mobile launchers themselves prior to both missile launch and hostilities.
Most effort to counter the mobile launchers is being placed into upgrading or
mimicking programs which enjoyed very limited success during the Persian Gulf War.
A step back from this is required to view the problem in its entirety and to determine a
possibly more effective counter effort. The programs currently under development are
essential to successfully defeating the threat, but are arguably not the complete solution.
2. Anti-Submarine Warfare and SCUD Hunting
The capability to detect, track, classify, and if needed, destroy an enemy
submarine has increased dramatically over the last half century. A Second World War
aircrewman, while visually (and later with the help of radar) searching the thousands of
square miles of the Bay of Biscay for German U-boats, would have dismissed the idea
of one day passively tracking a submarine while submerged as impossible. Today, this
is commonplace. The point is, to successfully counter a new, highly effective and
elusive threat, it is often necessary to look beyond the engineering bounds of what is
available, or can be modified, today. The ASW community has been effectively
searching for increasingly invisible targets for many years; the lessons have already been
learned and, in many cases, can be used to counter mobile missile launchers.
The general principles that provide the structure for the current ASW doctrine
have been developed through theory and tested by experience as the submarine gained
in capability and stealth sophistication. Although the specifics such as tactics and
hardware will be different to implement them, many of these principles that have brought
success to ASW directly apply to countering mobile launchers. Listed below is just a
sampling of ASW principles that require consideration, each with a brief statement
relating them to the mobile SRBM problem.
• Strong community identification. Essential for mission success. Like ASW, the
mobile SRBM counter effort requires a dedicated community that is committed to
defeating the threat. The predicted diversity of such an effort (possibly from
special force units on the ground to satellites in space) will place a need for a
strong community identification with a defined focal point for all aspects of the
counter effort.
• Intense scrutiny of enemy signatures. Every possible signature, ranging from the
obvious (infrared, electromagnetic, etc.) to the not so obvious (seismic, aural, tire
patterns, etc.) needs careful examination for potential exploitation. Signatures play
a large role in both detection and classification of targets.
• Understanding of enemy tactics. The ability to predict or estimate the actions of
the enemy mobile launcher force is invaluable in developing tactics for specific
situations.
• Environment considerations. The environment of the counter effort will change
from enemy to enemy, country to country. Future conflicts may not all be fought
in a desert environment, as was the Persian Gulf War.
• Heavy emphasis on intelligence. Mobile launcher search without intelligence is
much like a needle search in one of many haystacks. Intelligence (HUMINT,
ELINT, etc.) can narrow the search to a single haystack, effectively giving the
search effort a starting point.
• Localization capabilities on many platforms. The more platforms with the
capability to localize a target the better. This increases the probability of a capable
unit being in the vicinity of a reported datum and giving the potential target little
or no time to evade.
• Integrated weapon and sensor platforms. This extends the last principle to target
destruction. It is optimal for the same platform that localizes the threat to be
capable of classification and destruction. This avoids potential time delays and
communication failures associated with calling in an attack.
• Large area search capabilities on a continuous basis. The capability to conduct
continuous search of large areas is required to gain initial detection on possible
targets. The system conducting the search must then be capable of providing a real
time datum to a platform capable of target localization, classification, and
destruction.
• Base watch and choke point tactics. Intelligence effort focused on the locating
and subsequent watching of launcher storage bases is vital to determine weapon
mobilization and estimating enemy order of battle. A choke point can be thought
of as an easily searched area where a target should pass through, usually due to
geographic constraints, to get from point A to point B. For mobile launchers, this
definition is simply extended to include paths of least resistance; highways and
bridges, for example.
• Tracking of all known threats at all times. Once a mobile launcher is detected
and classified, there must be the capability to continue tracking until either
hostilities erupt and it can be destroyed or it is no longer considered a threat.
• Well exercised, coordinated prosecution. An optimal counter effort must
combine the capabilities of all services as well as those of our Allies. Joint and
NATO exercises are required to ensure all participants involved with the effort are
in concert with each other.
• Quick and successful response to reported datum. This encompasses many of
the above principles. Once intelligence is received on a possible target, a capable
platform must arrive expeditiously at datum and perform effective localization.
The mobile SRBM counter effort is still in its infancy. It should not be
limited by engineering constraints. The effort, like ASW, is multi-faceted and the
solving of the problem should start from the ground level, requiring knowledge from a
broad array of science as well as engineering. The general principles of ASW should
be used as a basic structure, or guideline, to ensure the effort is focused in the direction
to optimally counter the threat today and into the future.
Many of the principles listed in this section involve or imply the prosecution
of mobile launchers prior to receiving cuing data from a missile launch. The next section
points out the benefits to be gained through the inclusion of both pre-launch search tactics
and pre-hostility intelligence in the mobile launcher counter effort doctrine through the
analysis of a circulation model.
C. A CIRCULATION MODEL
A simple model can help show the benefits of prosecuting the mobile launchers
prior to missile launch. Figure 1 shows a circulation model which approximates the
general flow of an enemy mobile missile launcher during mobilization and hostilities.
During peacetime, the mobile launchers are kept at storage bases. As with all weapon
systems, it is assumed the launchers deploy during peacetime for the general upkeep of
the systems and proficiency training for the crews, but eventually return to storage. As
the possibility of war increases, the launchers are covertly deployed, either individually
or in groups, to forward replenishment bases to await firing instructions. As hostilities







Figure 1. Mobile SRBM Launcher Circulation Model
replenishment base to a designated launch area, and then back to the replenishment base
for re-armament and further instructions.
A probability of survival (avoiding destruction) for the launchers can be assigned
to each leg of the cycle, represented by qj and q2 in Figure 1. This cycle will continue
until the launcher is destroyed or hostilities cease (assumes no upper bound on the supply
of missiles). Although a model such as this is simple in both construction and nature,
broad insight can be gained through its analysis.
The model in Figure 1 resembles a simple circulation model developed and
analyzed by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) in 1969 [Ref. 3]. The CNA
model was developed to study an idealized, steady state antishipping campaign carried
out by independently operating submarines. The CNA analysis centered on the scenario
where the probability of survival of a submarine on its transit to a patrol area is equal
to the probability of survival for the transit home (qi =q2). Since a submarine is
vulnerable to essentially the s. me ASW search and detection tactics on both transit legs,
this is a reasonable assumption. In the case of a mobile missile launcher, however, very
different tactics must be used on the outbound and return transits. On the return transit,
the primary detection data comes from the flaming datum of the missile launch to locate
the launchers position. On the outbound leg, pre-hostility intelligence data to predict
launcher locations and pre-missile-launch search tactics must be relied upon for initial
detection. Without such information, the survival probability on the outbound leg, qu
would be very close, if not equal, to 1.0. After initial detection by whatever means, the
localization, classification, and destruction probabilities of both legs are assumed equal
(same prosecution tactics applied).
This thesis extends the analysis in Ref 3 to a more realistic model for the mobile
launcher problem, where the probabilities, qj and a^, are not equal. Specifically, the
focus is determining what effect a reduction in q, from the current value of
approximately 1.0 will have on the expected number of missile launches as a function of
the launcher survival probability after launch (q^. Due to the excellent cuing data
provided for initial detection by a missile launch, it is assumed q!^q2.
Let a successful cycle by a mobile launcher be defined as surviving the transit to
the launch area and the launch of a missile. All launchers are assumed to begin the cycle
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at a forward replenishment base. This implies that the first cycle is defined as the transit
from the forward base to the launch area. All subsequent cycles are defined as surviving
the transit from the launch area to the forward base, and then back to the launch area.
Of specific interest are the following:
• The probability distribution of the number of successful cycles completed by a
launcher before being killed, and its expected value,
• The probability distribution of the total number of missile launches by all mobile
launchers in a conflict, and its expected value.
1. Circulation Model Analysis
The following notation is needed:
n = estimated total number of enemy mobile launchers.
Q = number of successful cycles per mobile launcher i (random
variable).
Mj= number of missile launches per launcher i per successful cycle
(fixed). 1
q!= Pr{mobile launcher survives transit to launch area and launches
missile}.
c\2= Pr{launcher survives transit from launch area to forward base}.
*For this thesis, it is assumed M
;
is fixed at 1 for all launchers. A mobile launcher,
unlike a submarine, has limited field reload capability, especially in a hostile
environment. The model can easily be adapted for M; > 1, if needed.
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The probability distribution of Q is geometric in nature,
fl-Qi. n =
^^{^(q^r-'a-q^), 11 = 1,2,3...
and is derived in Appendix A. The expected value (or average value) of Q is then
E[C.]=—^—
.
Let q2= ocq,, with <x being a constant less than one to reflect the decrease in launcher
survival probability after missile launch cuing data is received. The expected value of




As mentioned, the assumption is made that M
;
,
the number of missile launches per
launcher i per successful cycle, is equal to 1. It follows that the expected number of
missile launches by launcher i before destruction will simply equal the expected number
of cycles the launcher survives or
E[LAUNCHESJ=E[q].
Figure 2 is a plot of the expected number of missile launches by launcher i as a function
of oc with q! held constant at various feasible values. The interpretation of the plot
follows shortly.
Define the random variable R as the total resultant missile launches by all n
mobile launchers during a conflict. Assuming a large number of mobile launchers
12
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Figure 2. Expected Missile Launches as a Function of oc
operating independently, the probability distribution of R can be approximated by the
normal distribution (see Appendix A). The expected total resultant missile launches by
all mobile launchers in a conflict can be expressed as
E[R] =n EfLAUNCHESJ.
(1)
This model assumes worst case, an extended war with no upper limit on the supply of
enemy missiles. Hence, the model results can be looked upon as an upper bound on
expected missile launches during a conflict.
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2. Circulation Model Results
Possibly the most striking result obtained through the analysis of the
circulation model is displayed in Figure 2. As mentioned earlier, the current focus of
the mobile launcher counter effort is on the flaming datum tactic. Little attention has
been given to the importance of pre-missile-launch data gathering and prosecution.
Without such actions, it is reasonable to assume an outbound launcher survival
probability (q^ approximately equal to 1. Referring to the q, = 1.0 curve in Figure 2,
it is seen as oc increases above .65 or so (referred to as the critical oc value), the
number of expected launches by launcher i before destruction begin to increase
exponentially with no upper bound! A simple interpretation of this is if the flaming
datum tactic is unable to obtain a probability of mobile launcher kill of at least .35
(calculated as l-^qO, the expected number of missile launches may be unacceptably
high and the mobile launcher counter effort should be expanded. The plot includes
curves for q! equal to 1.0, .95, and .90. These curves effectively show the benefits of
pre-launch effort. As q! decreases due to pre-launch tactics and pre-hostility intelligence,
the critical oc value increases, and the maximum expected missile launches decrease
considerably.
An additional counter effort option is highlighted in Equation 1 . The expected
total resultant missile launches, E[R], is a function of both E[LAUNCHESJ, the expected
launches from a single launcher i, as well as n, the estimated total number of enemy
launchers to be used in the conflict. The following is obvious yet seemingly overlooked.
The fewer launchers that are allowed to enter the cycle (reducing n), due to successful
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interdiction upon the outbreak of hostilities, the fewer total missile launches result. Once
a launcher enters the cycle it is committed to covert operations, and the probability of
detection by friendly forces, much less its destruction, shrinks considerably. Of course
pre-hostility intelligence and subsequent interdiction, which the above implies, are
sensitive and possibly risky options that need to be approached and planned carefully.
Chapters III and IV further address this important problem.
In a conflict such as the Persian Gulf War, a short range ballistic missile
launched by a third world country need not reach its intended target for mission success.
The mere launch of the weapon can be a political victory for the enemy, spreading terror
through targeted friendly populations and governments. However, air defense systems
of the future are predicted to have no greater than 90 to 95 % efficiency in defeating
incoming missiles, leaving up to 10% to reach their destination [Ref. 4]. Also,
short range ballistic missiles, like all weapon systems, will only continue to increase in
accuracy and lethality. Therefore, perhaps it is also of interest to examine the effect of
pre-missile launch effort on the expected number of missiles which penetrate the air
defense system. This is the focus of the following subsection.
3. Further Analysis
Recall that the expected total resultant missile launches during an extended
conflict is defined as
15
E[R] =n E[LAUNCHESJ = n—?1_.
\
After launch, each missile is subject to an air defense network (PATRIOT, for example).
The air defense system attempts to destroy the missile prior to reaching its targeted area.
Let q3 = Pr{incoming missile survives air defense network}. Define the random variable
Sj as the number of missiles launched from launcher i that are not destroyed by the
friendly air defense network. The probability distribution for S; given Q, is binomial





Define the random variable T as the total number of enemy missiles which successfully
penetrate the air defense network and reach their targeted area from all n enemy








Equation 2 effectively shows the feasible options available to reduce the expected number
of missiles that penetrate and reach their targeted area. They are: (i) reducing n through
pre-hostility intelligence/interdiction effort, (ii) reducing q3 through upgrading air defense
systems such as PATRIOT, (iii) reducing q t through pre-launch tactics, and (iv) reducing
q2 through increasing the success rate of the flaming datum tactic. To analyze the results
of modifying the above parameters, a data table is useful.
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Table 1 contains the expected number of missiles that survive the air defense
network, E[Tj, using various feasible values for parameters, obtained for an example
analysis. For this example, the estimated number of launchers, n, is fixed at 100. Three
values of q3 , the missile survival probability, are listed across the first row of the table.
For each q3 , three values of a^, the return transit survival probability, are examined and
listed in the second row. Six values of q,, the outbound launcher survival probability,
from 1.0 to .5, are listed down the second column of the table. Due to the previous
assumption that qi^q2, some E[T] values are omitted.
As mentioned numerous times, the current focus of the mobile launcher
counter effort essentially neglects pre-launch effort, forcing q, to approach 1.0.
Examining the row of Table 1 which corresponds to q,= 1.0 gives E[T] values for
various combinations of c^ and q3 . The value of pre-launch tactics and pre-hostility
intelligence effort, especially in cases of both c^ and q3 being large, can be seen by
examining the rows corresponding to reduced values of q 1# Even a small reduction of
q, to .9, in cases where c^ also equals .9 (under any value of c^), results in a greater than
50% reduction in E[T]!
Table 1 can also be used to roughly determine the probabilities required to
obtain a determined acceptable level of missile hits. As an example, the shaded cells in
Table 1 show different combinations of parameters that yield an expected number of
missile hits of around 30. The analyst and decision maker can then determine which
combination of probabilities is the most feasible and cost effective to achieve in order to
obtain the desired E[T).
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TABLE 1. EXAMPLE OUTPUT
q3 .1 .3 .5
q2 .5 .7 .9 .5 .7 .9 .5 .7 .9
Qi
E[T] E[T] E[T]
1.0 20 33 100 60 100 300 100 167 500
.9 16 24 47 49 73 142 82 121 236
.8 13 20 - 40 61 - 66 102 -
.7 11 19 - 32 59 - 53 98 -
.6 9 - - 26 - - 43 - -
.5 7 - - 20 - - 33 - -
D. SUMMARY
In this chapter, the validity of the current focus of the mobile SRBM counter effort
was questioned. A new approach to the problem was suggested using the existing
general principles of ASW, recognized as the leader in countering elusive targets, as the
basic structure. The value of pre-missile-launch and pre-hostility effort was stressed
through a simple circulation model and its analysis.
Many of the principles that have led to success in ASW include pre-hostility
intelligence effort. As mentioned in this chapter, this is often a sensitive option and, if
used, must be carefully planned and based on informed decisions only. The focus of
Chapters III and IV is on the development of a quantifiable procedure to gain insight into
18
the determination of pre-hostility intelligence policies as well as the level of effort
required to achieve an acceptable number of expected missile launches.
19
HI. THE DECISION MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
As stated in Chapter I, one goal of this thesis is to provide the decision maker with
a tool which will give valuable insight into the development of pre-hostility intelligence
policies directed against the third world mobile missile launcher threat. Chapter II
argued that the inclusion of pre-hostility effort will lead to more effective results in
reducing expected missile launches than efforts focused on post-missile-launch tactics
only.
The model presented in this chapter and analyzed in the next will help determine
the appropriate level of intelligence effort to be used against the mobile SRBM threat by
quantifying the pre-hostility options available to the decision maker and identifying the
policies that minimize the expected number of missile launches during a conflict. The
costs and benefits of a pre-hostility intelligence effort are explored through decision
model analysis. An option to interdict the threat following intelligence gathering during
peacetime is included in the model for analysis.
B. DECISION MODELING
It is important to understand at this point that a decision model can only lead to
optimal policies if the results of the decisions made, and random events that occur, can
be measured or predicted. This is extremely relevant to this thesis in that calculated
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results of pre-hostility intelligence efforts to counter the third world mobile SRBM threat
may not be readily available today. As tactics and hardware are developed for a pre-
hostility intelligence effort, so too must their predicted effectiveness against the threat.
It is when these numbers become available that a model such as the one presented in
Chapter II can accurately predict results of a pre-hostility effort and the decision model
introduced in this chapter will become the most valuable. The model is developed and
analyzed using generic results and broad assumptions to obtain regions, rather than point
solutions, which are defined by model parameters, where one policy or set of decisions
is preferred to another.
Influence diagrams and decision tree analysis are the tools used to help formulate
and analyze the problem. It is worthwhile to review the basic structure and methodology
of these as well as the symbology specific to decision modeling.
1. Symbology
The symbology used throughout this thesis is consistent with that found in
most decision making literature. Each decision has a set of alternatives denoted by D.
In a multi-stage decision problem such as the one developed in this thesis, D
{
represents
the set of decision alternatives at stage i. D is used to represent a generic decision prior
to it being made.
Decision trees and influence diagrams utilize the same basic elements to
represent visually a problem, although the two are quite different in nature. A square
node represents a decision, a circle represents a random event, and a diamond represents





Figure 3. Decision Modeling Symbology
2. Influence Diagrams
Directed arcs are used between nodes in influence diagrams to indicate
possible dependence between them. The generic situation, X-»Y, would denote that event
Y may be dependent or could be influenced by the outcome of event X. All
combinations of nodes may be joined by directed arcs in influence diagrams. Another
important feature of these diagrams is that the nodes are placed in order to show the
natural sequence of events. Influence diagrams for the problem at hand will be
introduced in the next section. [Ref. 5]
3. Decision Trees
Decision trees give a visual representation of all possible outcomes of
decisions and random events that can occur in a given problem. Once again, the nodes
are placed in their natural sequence. Extending from each decision or random event
node, there will exist a number of branches equaling the number of possible decisions
or outcomes at that node. The decision tree for this thesis is constructed in the following
section and shown in Figure 6. [Ref. 5]
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The decision tree is used in conjunction with the influence diagrams.
Although the decision tree reveals the basic structure of the problem, it gives no insight
into any probabilistic dependence that may exist between events. Influence diagrams are
used to display this required information.
C. MODEL CONSTRUCTION
As alluded to in Chapter I, no specific tactics or hardware used for the prosecution
of mobile short range ballistic missile launchers are used in the decision model. A model
to gain insight into optimal policy development was sought that could be applied using
either information gathering techniques which may be available today, but more
realistically, those developed in the future. Also, by keeping the model as generic as
possible, it can be applied to countering other weapon systems that, as viewed by a
potential enemy, possess similar military or political qualities. For this reason, a very
broad term of intelligence effort is used to encompass all friendly pre-hostility search,
detection, and tracking capability that is available at the time the model is implemented.
By aggregating effort this way, a decision model can be constructed which focuses on
the question of whether or not a general pre-hostility intelligence effort should be
undertaken, and if so, under what circumstances or set of conditions.
A decision model must have a quantifiable result measure if it is to be useful in
making trade-offs among various possible decisions. Expected cost for the proposed
intelligence effort immediately comes to mind as continually tighter military budgets are
predicted. A measure perhaps more relevant, as evidenced by the Persian Gulf War and
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alluded to in Chapter II through the circulation model, is the total expected number of
missile launches from mobile launchers against friendly forces or populations during a
conflict, defined in the analysis as E[R]. As stated in Chapter I, this result measure is
based on the assumption that a third world country achieves, to a significant degree,
mission success by merely launching a missile and is independent of target destruction. 2
For modeling purposes, it is assumed that expected number of missile launches is indeed
the proper measure and the goal is to determine policies which will minimize this
number. Expected cost of the intelligence effort is carried through as a second attribute
for analysis if needed as well as a constant reminder to the decision maker that all
decisions have a price.
Hostilities with a third world country are assumed to follow a three stage escalating
process. All stages are defined in terms of the enemy's utilization of the weapon system
in question. Stage 1, peacetime, is defined as standard operating procedures (SOP) for
the general upkeep and proficiency training of the weapon system. Stage 2, mobilization,
is defined as an obvious departure from the SOP during times when the probability of
a conflict is approaching one. Stage 3, hostilities, occur when weapons are used. Again,
2The expected number of missiles penetrating the air defense network, E[T], also
introduced in Chapter II, was not used for the result measure as c^, the probability of
intercepting and destroying an incoming missile, is independent of the policies developed
to counter the mobile launchers.
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the decision model addresses a pre-hostility question so it follows that decisions will need
to be made at two distinct stages, peacetime and, given that it occurs, mobilization of the
mobile launchers.
Two distinct modes of intelligence gathering are considered in this thesis, covert
and overt. As will be clearly shown by the influence diagrams found in the next
subsection, each mode needs to be examined separately as the probability distributions
of the random events in the covert mode are not influenced by the decisions made at each
stage as they are in the overt mode. This assumes an intelligent enemy that will perceive
the intelligence effort in the overt mode and fail to do so in the covert mode. All further
analysis of the decision model is divided between covert and overt intelligence effort.
1. Sets and Influence Diagrams
The problem is comprised of two stages with decisions to be made during
peacetime and upon enemy mobilization of the mobile launchers. Let D
1
be the
peacetime decision set, or the set of alternatives available to the decision maker during
peacetime; it consists of two elements: (1) invest in intelligence effort, denoted by E
and (2) apply no effort, denoted by N. Let D2 be the mobilization decision set; it
consists of three elements: (1) intelligence effort, E, (2) no effort, N, and (3) interdict
prior to hostilities, denoted by I. It is a model assumption that interdiction at D2 , the
mobilization decision stage, is an option only if there has been intelligence performed
during peacetime (Dj = E).
Whichever decision is made during peacetime, whether the enemy mobilizes
or not is uncertain. The same holds true for the mobilization decision and the outbreak
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of hostilities. Let M be a Bernoulli random variable that is 1 if the enemy mobilizes and
if it does not. Inherent in this definition is the concept of a time period, say for
example, a year. If mobilization does occur during the year, M = 1 . Otherwise it is zero
and the decision problem can be repeated in the next period. Let H also be a Bernoulli
random variable that is 1 if hostilities break out and if they do not. The random
outcome sets are now defined as M = {0,1} and H = {0,1}.
The result measure set, R, contains the different levels of expected missile
launches {0, r,, r2 , r3 , r4 } from mobile launchers given the possible combinations of the
two decisions and the outcomes of the random events. Clearly, no missile launches
would occur (R=0) when no mobilization or hostilities occur. Let r, be the estimated
number of missile launches during a conflict given that no intelligence effort is applied
during peacetime or mobilization. Let r2 be the estimated number if no intelligence effort
is applied until mobilization of the launchers, r3 be the number if intelligence is
conducted during both peacetime and mobilization, and r4 be the estimate if intelligence
during peacetime is followed by interdiction upon mobilization. The influence diagrams
for the two intelligence effort cases and their descriptions follow.
a. Covert Intelligence
The covert intelligence influence diagram is shown in Figure 4. Two
decision nodes and two random event nodes interact to lead to a result node. The
sequence of the nodes is important. The peacetime decision (D,) is made, the enemy
either mobilizes or does not (M), the mobilization decision (D2) is made, hostilities may
or may not break out (H), and a number of missiles (R) are launched during the conflict.
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Figure 4. Covert Intelligence Influence Diagram
Note the arcs, which imply possible dependence, between the nodes. Of specific
importance in the covert case is that, since the intelligence effort is assumed to be
unknown to the enemy, the decisions that are made at each stage have no influence on
the probability of either threat mobilization or hostility break out and thus no arcs from
decision nodes to random event nodes exist.
b. Overt Intelligence
The overt intelligence influence diagram is shown in Figure 5. The
diagram is the same as the covert case except for the addition of three directed arcs.
This is of key importance. A potential enemy now has the knowledge, whether by
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Figure 5. Overt Intelligence Influence Diagram
recognition of actual intelligence gathering assets or simply word of mouth, that
intelligence is being gathered on his weapon system. Depending on the scenario, this
knowledge may influence both the probability of enemy mobilization and his willingness
to go to war. To represent this, arcs now extend from both decision nodes to the random
event node or nodes that follow them in the normal sequence of events. The concept of
overt intelligence is further examined in Chapter IV.
2. The Decision Tree
The decision tree which represents the problem with general parameters and
results is shown in Figure 6. The sequence of the nodes follows that shown in the
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Figure 6. The Decision Tree
influence diagrams. Extending from each of the decision nodes are branches which
represent all possible decision options at that stage. Applied to four of these decision
branches is a utility cost, c, of making that decision. Let c, be the mobilization period
cost of the intelligence effort, Cj be the cost of a decision to interdict at D2 , and c3 be the
peacetime cost of intelligence. Although not used by the model to determine optimal
policies, these utility costs are relevant to the decision maker in that they should include
derivatives of making a specific decision, such as potential political ramifications and
friendly casualties, as well as actual monetary cost. Those branches not labeled are
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assumed to have no cost. Each of the decision branches terminate at a random event
node as described earlier.
The random event nodes are labeled M for mobilization or H for hostilities.
Extending from each random event node are two branches which represent the uncertain
outcome, 1 or 0, of the random event. The parameters m and h have been used to
represent the estimated probabilities of each possible outcome of 1 occurring. The
probabilities of the outcomes, 1-m and 1-h by definition, have been omitted from the
decision tree diagram for reasons explained in the next subsection. Subscripts are used
to differentiate between estimated parameters under different policies with m, =
Pr{mobilization occurs given the peacetime decision is no effort} = Pr{M = l/D!=N}
and m2 = Pr{M = 1/D, = E}. The following four estimated probabilities of hostility break
out are also required: h[ = Prjhostilities occur given the peacetime decision is no effort,
mobilization occurs, and the mobilization decision is no effort} = Pr{H = l/D!=N,
M = l, D2 =N}, h2 = Pr{H=l/D,=N, M = l, D2 =E}, h3 = Pr{H= l/D!=E, M=l,
D2 =E}, andh4= Pr{H=l/Dj=E, M = l, D2 =I}. These probabilities are clearly labeled
on the decision tree.
The branches extending from the random event nodes terminate in either a
result node or the second stage decision node. All possible outcomes of the model are
represented by the different branches of the decision tree.
The decision tree structure shown in Figure 6 is the same for both the covert
and overt cases. However, the values of the estimated parameters used will be different.
These differences reflect the added dependencies alluded in the overt case.
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3. Possible Cases
The analysis of the decision model begins at the terminal or result nodes of
the decision tree. By working backwards, expected numbers of missile launches can be
calculated at each random event node and minimizations found at each decision node.
Each random event in the model is viewed as a simple Bernoulli trial with outcome 1
or 0. The general expected value (or average value) expression is then
E[value] = ap + b(l-p),
where a and b are the result values of each outcome and p is the probability of the
outcome with result value a occurring. Note that b=0 in the decision model, by
definition (no hostilities or mobilization will lead to missile launches) thereby
eliminating the second term from the equation and relieving the requirement for the
probabilities of the outcomes (1-m and 1-h).
As stated earlier, the goal is to find those decisions that minimize the expected
number of missile launches. Therefore, at the upper mobilization decision node (D2) of
the decision tree, choose
Min {hfu h2r2 } (3)
and at the lower D2 node, choose
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Min {h3r3 , h4r4}. (4)
Continuing to work backwards taking expected values, the optimal decision at peacetime
decision stage (D { ) is the one that again minimizes the expected number of missile
launches. This can be expressed as
Min {m
t
* Min {h,^, h2r2 }, m2 * Min {h3r3 , h4r4}}, (5)
where * indicates multiplication.
From (3) and (4), it immediately follows that four possible combinations,
referred to in this thesis as cases 1 through 4, of comparing expected number of missile
launches can occur at the mobilization decision stage (D2). Each case results in a
different set of choices to be compared at the peacetime decision node (D,). The logic
for case 1 is shown and the results of cases 2, 3, and 4 are summarized in Table 1.
Let case 1 in the comparison of expected missile launches at the mobilization




h3r3 < h4r4 .
The minimum expected value in each of the above inequalities is preferred. Therefore,
referring to the decision tree, the preferred decision for case 1 at the mobilization
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decision node is no effort (D2 = N) and the optimal decision at the lower is intelligence
(D2 = E). It follows from (5) that the optimal policy at D, is defined by
Min {m^r,, m^^}.
Each of the policies in the above set results in corresponding expected costs, calculated
in the same expected value manner, of
(0, c 3 4- nijC,).
Similarly, cases 2 through 4 can be readily defined and calculated. Table 2 summarizes
the results.
D. SUMMARY
The decision model has been constructed for the general case and the attributes
which determine as well as define the optimal policies have been identified. Two modes
of intelligence effort to counter mobile launchers, covert and overt, have been introduced
for analysis. At the mobilization decision stage (D2), four cases, defined by inequalities
comparing expected missile launches, exist and are summarized in Table 2. Chapter IV
introduces assumptions for both covert and overt intelligence modes that reduce the
number of feasible cases defined in Table 2 and ultimately lead to the identification of
optimal policies to counter the mobile missile launcher threat.
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TABLE 2. CASE DEFINITION SUMMARY
CASE CONDITIONS E[LAUNCHES] E[COST]
1 •Vi < h2r2
h3r3 < h4r4
Min {niih^i,













3 h,ri < h2r2
h3r3 > h4r4
Min {mjhjr!,
m2h4r4 } c3 + m2c2
4 h^! > h2r2









A. ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE MODES
As stated in Chapter III, all further analysis of the decision model is divided
between two distinct modes of intelligence effort, covert and overt. The influence
diagrams in Chapter III clearly reveal the necessity of this by displaying the difference
in probabilistic dependence of random events for covert and overt intelligence. In the
following sections, assumptions are introduced and the optimal policies for each
intelligence mode is determined in terms of model parameters and is graphically
displayed to determine the amount of effort required to achieve a specific level of
expected missile launches.
Although the estimated numbers themselves may change, the relationships between
the result measure parameters, (r1} r2 , r3 , r4), are assumed to be the same for covert and
overt intelligence. Chapter II argued that if pre-hostility intelligence is feasible, it will
be effective in reducing the number of missile launches. Keeping this in mind and
recalling that the parameter, r, is defined as the estimated total number of missile
launches given different sets of decisions made during peacetime and mobilization, it is
assumed that the most missile launches will occur when no intelligence effort is applied
prior to hostilities, represented by r,. The least missile launches are assumed to occur
when intelligence effort during peacetime is followed by interdiction prior to the outbreak
of hostilities, or r4 . The remaining two result measures, r2 and r3 , follow the assumed
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rule that less intelligence effort focused on the mobile launchers during peacetime and
mobilization will lead to higher numbers of missile launches should hostilities break out.
The relationships between the result measures used in the analysis of the model are
mathematically expressed as
r, > r2 > r3 > r4 . (6)
The relationships of the utility costs, c, associated with making specific decisions
are also assumed to be the same for covert and overt intelligence. Interdiction at the
mobilization decision stage (D2) is assumed to be the most costly. The utility cost of
intelligence effort after enemy mobilization is assumed to have a greater cost than
intelligence effort during peacetime. The relationships are expressed as •
c2 > c, > c3 .
Cost is not used in the decision model to determine the counter effort policies. However,
scenarios could exist where the optimal policy is somewhat unclear and cost can then be
used to further break out the preferred option. The decision maker must bear in mind
the consequences of any decisions made and the expected utility costs serve this purpose.
1. Covert Intelligence
Covert intelligence, by definition, requires that the effort take place without
enemy counter detection. Referring to the covert influence diagram shown in Figure 4,
36
the decisions made at each stage of the problem are assumed to have no influence on
either uncertain outcome of enemy mobilization or hostility break out. This is clear in
that the enemy, without knowledge of the intelligence effort, will continue to proceed
with operations as if no effort whatsoever is being applied. This directly leads to the
assumption that the probabilities of the similar uncertain events (hostilities or
mobilization) under a covert intelligence effort will be equal, expressed as




The final assumption is that friendly interdiction of the mobile launchers forces the
probability of hostilities, along that branch of the decision tree, to certainty, or
K = 1,
Directly, the above assumptions, combined with the result measure assumption shown
in (6), imply that
hi 1*! > h2r2 > h3r3 .
Therefore, referring to the case definitions summarized in Table 2, cases 2 and 4 only
require further analysis as the conditions for cases 1 and 3 are not met. For ease of
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notation, further covert intelligence analysis will use h to represent h
t ,
h2 , and h3 and m
to represent m, and m2 . Using the logic developed at the end of Chapter III, the analysis
of covert intelligence, cases 2 and 4, follows.
Referring again to the case definitions found in Table 2, case 2 holds only if
the conditions




are met. Ignoring the peacetime decision made to arrive there, the above inequalities
imply that the preferred decision at either mobilization decision node (D2) is intelligence
in that it leads to the lower number of expected missile launches in both circumstances.
The expected number of missile launches that need to be compared at the
peacetime decision node (DJ to determine the optimal policy for case 2 are also drawn
from Table 2. It follows from the result measure assumptions in (6) that the inequality,
mhr3 < mhr2 ,
will always hold. Literally tracing the route through the decision tree which terminates
in r3 (the estimated number of missile launches from the minimum expected value
expression above), gives the optimal policy, or set of decisions, for covert intelligence,
case 2. They are: intelligence at the peacetime decision stage (D
t
*= E) and if launcher
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mobilization, continue with intelligence (D2*= E). Finally, referring back to Table 2,
expected missile launches and corresponding costs for this policy are
E[Launches] = mhr3 and
E[Cost] = c3 + mcj.
Using the same logic from above and referring again to Table 2, it follows
that case 4 exists if the inequalities
r4 < hr3 and
hr2 < hr^
hold. Examining the decision tree with these relationships imply the optimal decision at
mobilization (D2) is interdiction given the peacetime decision is to apply intelligence
effort and to begin an intelligence effort if no effort is applied during peacetime. Due
to the assumptions in (6), the inequality comparing expected missile launches at the
peacetime decision stage,
mr4 < mhr2 ,
will always hold. Again from the decision tree, this condition implies the optimal policy
for case 4 is to perform intelligence during peacetime (0/= E) and if the threat is
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mobilized, interdict (D2*= I). This policy leads to expected missile launches and costs
for covert intelligence, case 4 of
E[Launches] = mr4 and
E[Cost] = c3 4- mc^
The optimal policies for cases 2 and 4 under a covert intelligence effort can
be combined and displayed graphically as a function of h, the estimated probability of
hostilities. This is shown in Figure 7. It is interesting to note that in order to determine
the covert optimal policy, only the ratio of the result measures, r4 and r3 , is required, not
each individual estimated number of missile launches. This relieves the analyst of the
task of estimating r, and r2 . Note also from Figure 7 that the decision maker is not
required to make a point estimate of h to determine the optimal policy; a region or
interval will suffice. As alluded to earlier, if the estimate of h does lie near the border
of the two regions, making the optimal policy unclear, the decision maker can use
expected cost to help distinguish the optimal policy.
The expected missile launches under covert optimal policies can also be
plotted as a function of h. This is shown in Figure 8. Note that expected missile
launches increase linearly with h from with a slope of mr3 and then become constant
with a maximum value of mr4 for h > r4/r3 . Recall that under covert intelligence the
parameter m, or the probability of enemy mobilization, cannot be influenced by friendly
decisions. The plot clearly shows that to effectively reduce the expected launches during
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Figure 7. Covert Optimal Policies
a conflict to a desired level, the parameters r3 and r4 need to be reduced. This is
accomplished through increasing the effectiveness or amount of both pre-hostility
intelligence and interdiction.
The analysis can be continued by combining the covert intelligence results
with those obtained in the circulation model analysis presented in Chapter II. The details
of this further analysis are contained in Appendix B. The interesting result is the ratio,






Figure 8. Expected Missile Launches: Covert Optimal Policies
r3 n
where n represents the estimated total of enemy launchers and n(4) represents the
estimated number of launchers remaining after an interdiction effort. This implies the
optimal policy decision is based on the estimated fraction of launchers remaining after
interdiction, independent of circulation model launcher survival probabilities, qj and o^.
As an example, say the analyst or decision maker estimates that 40% of the
mobile launchers could be eliminated by interdiction, which corresponds to a fraction of
launchers remaining of .6. If the probability of hostilities, h, is estimated to be
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anywhere in the region greater than .6, the optimal policy is to gather intelligence during
peacetime and interdict upon mobilization. If the probability of hostilities is estimated
as less than .6, to continue to gather intelligence upon mobilization is optimal. If h is
considered to be very close to .6, the utility cost of each option is used by the decision
maker to determine the optimal policy.
The covert intelligence expected launches plot (see Figure 8) can be
constructed for this example by noting that the equations needed to calculate expected










Again, the benefits of pre-hostility intelligence gathering and pre-missile-launch search
tactics can be shown by simple sensitivity analysis. This is done by plotting various
decreasing values of qls the outbound launcher survival probability. For this example,
let q2, the return transit launcher survival probability, be fixed at .7, the probability of
enemy mobilization, m, at .6, and the estimated number of launchers, n, at 100. Using
values for q! of 1.0 (current counter effort focus), .9, and .8 in the equations for
expected launches, the plot in Figure 9 is created.
The plot clearly shows that as qj is decreased, the expected number of missile
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Figure 9. Example Covert Expected Missile Launches
covert intelligence effort, expected missile launches can only be reduced by decreasing
either r3 , which was effectively achieved in this example by decreasing ql5 or r4 . The
covert intelligence analysis also revealed that reducing r4 involves both pre-hostility
intelligence as well as interdiction, which, depending on the political sensitivity of the
scenario, may or may not be an option.
2. Overt Intelligence
The result measure relationships shown in (6) still hold true for overt
intelligence as well as friendly interdiction forcing hostilities (hi= 1). However, an
overt intelligence effort differs from covert in that the potential enemy now is assumed
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to have knowledge of the effort. This knowledge may or may not influence the outcomes
of the uncertain events. The assumption is made that the enemy may be deterred by the
knowledge that the movement and operations of his weapon system, which he feels
possesses great political or military effectiveness, is the focus of a heavy intelligence
effort. It is also assumed that the more overt intelligence applied, the greater the
deterrence effect. The model parameter relationships which are affected by this
assumption and differ from covert intelligence are expressed by the inequalities
h[ > h2 > h3 and
m, > m2 . (7)
The assumptions in (7), together with those in (6), directly imply that
hir i > h2r2 > h3r3
and, as in the covert analysis, cases 1 and 3 defined by Table 2 are eliminated. Cases
2 and 4 require further analysis. As with covert intelligence, each case is analyzed
separately.
Again referring to Table 2, and recalling that h4 is unity, case 2 holds if the
inequalities






hold. Due to leading to fewer expected launches in both inequalities above, intelligence
is the preferred option at both mobilization decision nodes (D2). The assumptions shown
in (6) and (7) lead to determining the optimal policy by noting that the inequality, drawn
from Table 2, which again compares expected missile launches at the peacetime decision
node (Dj), of
m2h3r3 < m^r,,
must always be true. By following the route through the decision tree which contains
the parameters of the minimum expected missile launches from above, it follows that the
optimal policy for case 2 under overt intelligence is to perform intelligence during
peacetime (Di*= E) and continue with intelligence if mobilization occurs (D2*= E). The
expected missile launches and costs for overt intelligence, case 2 are then
E[Launches] = m2h3r3 and
E[Cost] = c3 + m^.
Figure 10 plots the above expected number of missile launches as a function of m2 , the
probability that the enemy will mobilize given an overt intelligence effort during
peacetime. The parameter m2 was chosen to plot against in that mobilization is the first
46
Figure 10. Expected Missile Launches: Overt Effort Case 2
event that can possibly be influenced by an overt intelligence effort and therefore,
perhaps, the most tangible to the decision maker. The plot clearly shows that if under
the conditions of case 2, any overt intelligence effort that is effective in reducing the
probability of enemy mobilization (m2) or his willingness to go to war (h3) will result in
a corresponding decrease in expected number of missile launches.
Again, referring to Table 2, case 4 is defined by the inequalities
h3r3 > r4 and
h^! > h2r2 .
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Using the same methodology as before, these conditions imply that the preferred decision
at the mobilization node (D2) is interdiction given intelligence effort during peacetime and
intelligence if no effort during peacetime. However, the optimal policy for case 4 is not
clear. Recalling that the optimal policy is defined by the set of decisions made, or route
through the decision tree, which minimizes the expected number of missile launches, the
set of expected missile launches,
{mih2r2 , m2r4 },
drawn from Table 2, must be compared at Du the peacetime decision node. Due to the
h2 term in the first expected value of the set, which can vary between and 1, the
relationship between them is not obvious. By setting the two expected values equal and
solving for m2 , the relationship can be expressed as the linear function





This function is plotted in Figure 1 1 to obtain a graphical representation of the optimal
policies under overt intelligence, case 4. Three distinct regions, which can vary in size
as the slope of the line defined by (8) increases or decreases, are obtained and denoted
as I, II, and III on the plot.
Recalling the overt intelligence assumption that n^ is always greater than m2 ,

















Figure 11. Optimal Decision Plot: Overt Effort Case 4
m2h4r4 < m,h2r2,
holds. The optimal policy under these conditions is to perform intelligence during
peacetime (TV= E) and interdict if the threat mobilizes (D2*= I). The expected missile
launches and costs under this policy are
E[Launches] = m2r4 and
E[Cost] = c3 + m2c2 .
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Region II is the most interesting, showing the area where the preferred decision is to
apply no intelligence effort during peacetime. This situation exists when the inequality
m,h 2r2 < m2h4r4
holds. The optimal policy is now defined as no effort during peacetime (Dj*= N)
followed by intelligence should the enemy mobilize (D2 * = E). It follows that the
expected missile launches and costs for this policy are
E[Launches] = m,h2r2 and
E[Cost] = nijCi.
Figure 12 combines the results of the analysis of feasible regions II and III
under overt effort, case 4. As with case 2, the plot shows expected missile launches as
a function of m2 , the probability of mobilization given overt intelligence during
peacetime. It is interesting to note from the plot that the deterrence effect of overt
intelligence on the probability of mobilization does not cause a decrease in the expected
number of missile launches until m2 is driven below the critical value, defined by









Figure 12. Expected Missile Launches: Overt Effort Case 4
miV2
This is in contrast to case 2; recalling that, while under the conditions of case 2, any
reduction in m2 leads to a decrease in the expected number of launches. If the decision
maker estimates that m2 is, indeed, in the region above the critical value and the option
of different amounts of overt intelligence does exist, there is yet another decision to be
made. If the decision maker feels that more overt intelligence can drive m2 below the
critical value then it is perhaps wise, if the utility cost is acceptable, to do so.
Conversely, if it is estimated that more overt intelligence will not decrease m2 below the
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critical value, or the utility cost is too high, it is the best decision, based on expected
missile launches only, to remain with the current amount of intelligence. Note that by
reducing r4 (by increasing the effectiveness of an interdiction effort) it moves the critical
value to the right and the region where the above phenomena exists grows smaller.
Overt intelligence provides for more options to reduce the expected number
of missile launches during a conflict than covert intelligence. However, it must be
remembered that this advantage is possible only if the option exists. Rules of
engagement or a delicate political situation may force a covert effort to be the only
choice. This concept also holds true for the mobilization decision stage option of
interdiction. It may be that friendly forces are instructed to wait for the enemy to initiate
hostilities. In this case, the decision model can still be utilized by simply ignoring the
branch of the decision tree which represents interdiction and performing the analysis
described in this chapter.
B. MODEL SUMMARY
1. Decision Model User's Guide
The flow chart shown in Figure 13 delineates the suggested steps to be taken
by the analyst to utilize the decision model presented in this thesis. The initial decision
in the flow chart of which intelligence mode is to be analyzed (covert or overt) is a
separate issue which must be addressed by the decision maker, independent of the
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Figure 13. Decision Model Flow Chart
2. Conclusions
The model construction as well as the assumptions made have been designed
to approximate reality. The result measure of expected missile launches was selected to
reflect the current political and social attitude towards mobile short range ballistic
missiles. Given that they are acceptable to the decision maker, the model gives valuable
insight into the amount of pre-hostility intelligence effort required to obtain desired levels
of expected missile launches as well as the construction of optimal policies to counter a
third world weapon system such as the mobile short range ballistic missile.
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For both covert and overt intelligence efforts, no point estimates or specific
solutions are included in the insight gained through analysis of the model, rather, regions
of preference are stressed. Should a combination of estimated parameters cause the
optimal policy to be unclear, a second attribute of expected cost has been carried through
to help determine the preferred decisions. The plots of expected missile launches enable
the decision maker and analyst to perform relatively simple sensitivity analysis by clearly
showing the model parameters that can be manipulated for each mode of intelligence and
how each affects the expected number of missile launches.
The result measure relationships expressed in (6) assured that the developed
optimal policies never included no intelligence effort during both peacetime and
mobilization. However, it is perhaps counter intuitive that there does exist conditions
under overt intelligence where no effort is optimal during peacetime.
A decision model of this nature is not meant to dictate policy. As an example,
should the model reveal that interdiction is the preferred policy, it must be remembered
that this is with respect to the mobile SRBM threat only. This would be used merely as
one input into higher level strategy planning. By quantifying the different options
available, the input will be based on an informed decision made by the decision maker
and avoid one based solely on past experience or feelings.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A. THE INTEGRATED APPROACH
The third world mobile short range ballistic missile problem possesses many of the
same traits as classical anti-submarine warfare. Many of the developed principles used
in ASW can be used to help effectively counter the mobile SRBM threat. It is
recommended that these principles are considered as a possible structure for the mobile
SRBM counter effort doctrine.
The analysis of the circulation model presented in Chapter II clearly shows the
benefits of pre-missile-launch search tactics and pre-hostility intelligence effort in
reducing the number of expected missile launches and missiles which penetrate the air
defense during a conflict. Perhaps more striking is the penalty incurred, in terms of
exponentially increasing expected missile launches, for focusing on post-missile-launch
tactics which do not result in a sufficient probability of kill to offset the absence of pre-
launch prosecution effort. This will only increase in importance as third world countries
obtain biological and nuclear warfare capability and the maximum number of acceptable
missile launches during a conflict diminishes towards zero.
As hardware and tactics are developed to counter the mobile SRBM prior to the
outbreak of hostilities, the decision model constructed and analyzed in Chapters III and
IV will become increasingly relevant. The decision maker now has a tool to aid in the
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development of optimal pre-hostility intelligence policies to counter the threat based on
insight gained through firm analysis.
The Persian Gulf War highlighted the mobile SRBM as an effective and elusive
threat. Emphasis must be placed on pre-hostility intelligence effort and pre-missile-
launch prosecution tactics as they are integral parts of a complete effort to successfully
counter such a threat in future conflicts.
B. RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER STUDY
Recall that the decision model presented in this thesis aggregated all friendly pre-
hostility detection, classification, and tracking capability as intelligence effort. As
specific methods to gather intelligence are developed and quantified (space, air, and
human assets, for example), the aggregated intelligence effort could then be split and the
decision model used to compare the effectiveness of each specific method used alone, as
well as in various combinations of others, to determine the optimal force structure to
counter the threat.
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APPENDIX A. CIRCULATION MODEL PROBABILITY DERIVATION
The probability used in Chapter II for the mobile launcher circulation model is
derived in this appendix. The purely mathematical steps have been omitted for clarity
of argument.
The probability distribution for the random variable Q, defined in Chapter II as the
number of successful cycles by mobile launcher i before being destroyed is geometric in
nature and derived as follows. The initial successful cycle is defined as the launcher
surviving the transit from the forward replenishment base to the launch area and the
subsequent launch of a missile. The probability that Cj=0 (the probability that the
launcher is destroyed before a single success) is simply one minus the probability that
it survives the first transit from the forward base to the launch area. Thus,
P(C,=0) = 1-q,.
All subsequent successful cycles are defined as surviving the return transit to the forward
base and the outbound transit back to the launch area. The probability that Q=l is
defined as the probability that the launcher survives the initial transit to the launch area,
q l5 and is destroyed prior to reaching the launch area for the second time on either the
return leg to the forward base or the transit back to the launch area. This is expressed
as
57
P(Q = 1) = qi (l-qiq2).




= 3) = q.Cq^^l-q.q^
P(Q = n) = q.Cq.q^-'a-q^)






The expected value of C, is then calculated as
E[CJ=5> P(q=n) = qi(l- qiq2)£n (q^r 1
n=0 n=l
ii
The variance of Q is defined as
VARtCJ^EtC^-Etqr
and is calculated as follows:
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As stated in Chapter II, it is assumed that a successful cycle by a single launcher implies
a single missile launch. Therefore, it follows that the expected number of missile
launches by launcher i before destruction will be equal to the expected number of cycles
by launcher i before destruction. This is expressed as
EtLAUNCHESJ^Etq].
The same holds true for the variance, or
VARtLAUNCHESJ = VARtCJ.





where n is the estimated total number of enemy mobile launchers. Assuming the
launchers operate independently of each other and there are a large number of them in
a conflict, the distribution of R can be approximated by the normal distribution, or
R-NCnEfLAUNCHESJ, nVARtLAUNCHESJ).
The random variable S; is defined as the number of missiles launched from launcher
i that are not destroyed by the friendly air defense network. For each successful cycle,
one missile is launched. Each missile will either be destroyed or not. The probability
that S
;
is equal to some constant k, given a number of successful cycles, is binomial.
The probability distribution is expressed as
P(S^k|Cr c)=(^q3 k(l-q3).c - k
The conditional expected value is then
EfSjCJ^
and the conditional variance is
VARPjq-qqjd-q,).






VARtSJ -EtVARtSj | CJ] + VAR[E[S i | CJ]
q3q 1 (l-q2 q 1 +2q3 q2 q 1 -q3q 1 )
The random variable T is defined as the total number of enemy missiles that are not
destroyed by the enemy air defense network. This implies that
i=l
where n is again the total number of enemy launchers. For a large number of
independent, identically distributed missiles that are not destroyed by the air defense, T












APPENDIX B. COVERT ANALYSIS CONTINUED
Recall from Chapter II that the expected total number of missile launches, E[R],
is equal to n, the estimated number of enemy launchers that enter the circulation model,
multiplied by E[LAUNCHESJ, the expected number of launches by launcher i before
being destroyed. Combining the notation from Chapter II and Chapters III and IV, the
result measures from the decision model, (iu r2 , r3 , r4) can be generally expressed as
r,- 5L_, j = 1,2,3,4 (9)
J
1-q.V
where the superscript (j) on the parameters represents the four possible outcomes of the
decision tree. For example, n (1) represents the estimated number of launchers remaining
given the peacetime decision is no effort (D,"= N), mobilization occurs (M = 1), the
mobilization decision is no effort (D2*= N), and hostilities occur (H = 1). It follows
that
n<» = n® = n (3) = n,







represents the branch of the decision tree which contains the option to interdict.
The outbound launcher survival probabilities, with respect to pre-hostility
intelligence, follow the thesis argument that more intelligence leads to a reduced chance
of survival. This is expressed as
1.0=q,"»>q,o>>q,' 31
.
It is assumed the outbound launcher survival probability upon hostilities is approximately
the same whether peacetime intelligence is followed by more intelligence or interdiction
upon threat mobilization. This assumption is expressed as
(3) (4)
q. =qi =qr
Post-missile-launch counter effort tactics are assumed to be independent of pre-hostility
intelligence effort. Therefore, it follows that all return transit launcher survival
probabilities are equal. Thus,
q?=q2 ,j = 1,2,3,4.
To determine the optimal covert policy, Figure 7 in Chapter IV shows that the

















which is the estimated fraction of launchers remaining after interdiction!
The expected number of missile launches can also be expressed in terms of the
circulation model results. Recalling that q/3) = q/4) and q2 (3) = q^, the expected launches
for covert intelligence, case 2 are
EfLAUNCHES] = mhr- =mh





1. Schemmer, B.F., "Special Ops Teams Found 29 SCUDS Ready to Barrage Israel
24 Hours Before Cease-Fire, " Armed Forces Journal International, p. 36, July
1991.
2. Miller, M. C, "Operation Desert Sham," The New York Times, p. A-21, 24 June
1992.
3. Center for Naval Analyses Research Contribution No. 120, Distribution ofLosses
in an Idealized Antishipping Campaign, by J. Hall, July 1969.
4. Opall, B., "SCUD Variants Pose New Threat to SDIO Plans," Defense News, v. 7,
p. 40, 20-26 July 1992.
5. Marshall, K.T. and Oliver, R.M., Decision Making and Forecasting, pp. 7-9,




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145




Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs 2
RM 5E56, Original Headquarters Building
Central Intelligence Agency Headquarters
Washington, DC 20505
4. Commander Naval Air Systems Command 1
AIR-5262J
Washington, DC 20361-5260
5. Professor Kneale T. Marshall Code OR/Mt 5
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
6. CAPT George W. Conner Code OR/Co 2
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
7. LT Mark A. Ehlers 1
7108 Eagles Perch Drive
Jacksonville, FL 32244
/
66




DEMCO

